The problem of derterminism - freedom as self-determination

Abstract

There are reasons for determinism. However, this col-lides with the everyday experience of autonomy. The following argumentation claims that determinism and autonomy are compati-ble. A consideration going back to MacKay makes clear that I myself cannot foresee in principle my own determinations; hence fatalism is unfounded. In order to save freedom with respect to physical determinations (especially concerning the processes of brain) quantum-physical indeterminateness has often been invoked, but such ran-domness misses the meaning of freedom. As to the possibility of knowledge, however, acting is something like a choice-of-oneself. The results of contemporary brain-research, especially those of Benjamin Libet and recently ofJohn-Dylan Haynes, suggesting that deci-sions are unconsciously determined, appear to refute that. But, as Libet has also shown, in the end consciousness is ever capable to control action. So knowledge indeed and at last the idea of a choice-of-oneself may itself become a determining condition of acting, whereby the form of rational self-determination time reveals to be a person’s utmost autonomy constituting his spiritual identity at all.

Keywords Determinism; autonomy; fatalism; brain-research; Libet; choice-of-oneself; self-determination.